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Abstract 
Does European business lobby for international investment agreements? In the public debate, 
international investment policymaking has become almost synonymous with a policy domain subject 
to an undue influence of business on policy outcomes. This paper argues that business preferences and 
lobbying have little effect on outcomes in international investment policy. The perceived beneficial 
effects of international investment agreements are small, distant and uncertain, which results in limited 
business lobbying. Instead, bureaucratic politics seems to decisively shape international investment 
policymaking in Europe. The paper confirms these hypotheses by means of a detailed assessment of 
German and EU international investment policymaking before and after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, in-depth case studies of major international investment negotiations and an 
evaluation of the changing design of European international investment agreements. It concludes with 
a discussion of the TTIP negotiations as an important outlier to the generally observed passivity of 
European business in this domain. 
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I. Introduction  
 
International investment policy has become synonymous in the public debate with a policy domain 
subject to undue business influence. The non-governmental organisation (NGO) Campact qualifies 
international investment policy and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) as a “corporate system of 
unjustice” (Campact, 2014). Corporate Europe Observatory (2014a), another Brussels-based NGO, 
suggests that ISDS is a product of “business propaganda” and has an excessive influence on 
policymakers. The German magazine Der Spiegel (2014) suggests that the planned ISDS provisions 
under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership meant a “payday for the vultures” of 
multinational business. Businesses would sue states over any kind of profit-reducing regulation, thus 
hollowing out democracy. These accounts share the assumption that businesses lobby and pressure 
policymakers into concluding international investment agreements (IIAs) with ISDS provisions 
despite their harmful impact on democracy and citizens. Through a scientific lens, these accounts 
stipulate that business preferences and lobbying (independent variable) account for the conclusion of 
IIAs with ISDS provisions (dependent variable).  
 
Empirical research on the role of business preferences and lobbying in international investment policy 
and the conclusion of IIAs is rare. This lack of research is remarkable considering the economic 
importance and political salience of the topic. This article contributes to closing this research gap. It 
raises the research question of the extent to which businesses hold preferences and lobby for the 
conclusion of IIAs with ISDS provisions in the European Union (EU). The article advances the 
argument that the role of business preferences and lobbying is generally overstated in the context of 
the EU and its Member States. Businesses take little interest in international investment policy and the 
conclusion of IIAs with ISDS due to their limited, uncertain and distant impacts. Theories of 
bureaucratic politics generally account for outcomes in international investment policymaking better. 
The vocal support of European business for TTIP, including its investment provisions, constitutes a 
remarkable outlier, which arguably reflects bureaucratic mobilisation of businesses rather than 
genuine interest. The study employs qualitative methods to empirically verify its claims. It draws on 
extensive press and literature research, field research in the form of a five-month internship in the 
Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission, and 42 semi-structured anonymised 
interviews with international investment policymakers from the European Commission, the Member 
States and business representatives of national and European umbrella associations. Most of the 
interviews were carried out in 2012-2013, before the start of the heated TTIP debate. 
 
After an introduction to international investment policy for non-experts, the article briefly summarises 
studies analysing business influence on international investment policymaking and highlights their 
limitations. The fourth and fifth sections of the paper develop the theoretical arguments in greater 
detail and present empirical evidence. They assess the role of European business in international 
investment policymaking in the German and EU contexts, in the negotiations on the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), and the evolving design of 
European IIAs to clarify the influence of European business on policy outcomes. The last sections 
conclude and discuss why European business, nonetheless, plays an active role in the policy debate on 
the investment provisions in the TTIP.     
II. A brief introduction to international investment and the international investment regime  
 
Since the 1980s, international investment has become the backbone of economic globalisation. 
Companies invest and establish production sites and affiliates abroad to take advantage of lower 
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production costs or to access new markets or scarce resources and expertise. International investment 
– or in more technical terms foreign direct investment (FDI) – is the glue of global value chains. The 
volume of global investment stocks has grown tenfold since 1990. While international investment 
used to be a minor economic phenomenon in western European and northern American economies, it 
has become a major force in the global economy. The rise of international investment is a consequence 
of technological innovations which lower communication and transportation costs, and of shifts 
toward more liberal foreign economic policies welcoming foreign investment.  
 
Figure 1: World inward FDI stock in trillion US Dollars (1980-2012) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2016). 
 
However, international investment may have positive and negative impacts on the home and host 
economies of international investors (Dunning, 2008; Navaretti and Venables, 2004). It may, inter 
alia, promote technology spill-overs, promote development and competitiveness, and offer consumers 
access to cheaper and better products and services. On the other hand, international investment may 
promote outsourcing, destroy jobs, and undermine national security through foreign control over 
strategic and sensitive economic sectors. States pursue international investment policies to maximise 
the benefits and to minimise the risks of international investment activity. States use various 
instruments to ensure that international investment increases national welfare, such as investment 
review mechanisms for foreign takeovers, investment promotion agencies, investment guarantee 
schemes for national investors going aboard, and finally international investment agreements (IIAs).  
 
IIAs are the most important and controversial tool in international investment policymaking today. 
They stand at the centre of the public debate and of this article. IIAs typically encompass three types 
of provisions: 1) post-establishment treatment standards; 2) investment protection provisions and 
dispute resolution mechanisms in the form of ISDS; and 3) investment liberalisation commitments. 
Investment liberalisation commitments remain, however, an exception. Only a small fraction of the 
approximately 3000 IIAs currently in force contain such commitments. The EU and its Member States 
have not included liberalisation commitments in their IIAs for legal reasons. Prior to the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the relevant competences were scattered between the EU and its Members 
States. The conclusion of IIAs with liberalisation commitments would have required so-called mixed 
agreements, which would complicate the negotiation and ratification processes (Basedow, 2016a; 
Dimopoulos, 2011).   
 
The purpose of IIAs is to overcome the so-called ‘mousetrap’ problem of international investment 
activity (Guzman, 1997; Elkmans et al. 2006). Most states want to attract foreign investors to boost 
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development, growth and employment. They signal to foreign investors that they offer an attractive, 
secure and predictable business and investment environment. However, host states are sovereign and 
cannot credibly commit vis-à-vis individuals or firms under their jurisdiction. Foreign investors may 
therefore fear that once they have sunk their capital, host states may retract, discriminate and 
expropriate without paying appropriate compensation. This uncertainty may cause a so-called ‘hold-
off’ problem. In other words, in cases of doubt over the reliability of host states foreign investors may 
abstain from business projects and thereby impose economic opportunity costs on host and home 
states. In the 1950s, states therefore developed IIAs to address and overcome this ‘hold-off’ problem. 
Through IIAs under public international law, states commit vis-à-vis other states to treat foreign 
investors in line with minimum standards of the rule of law and to allow foreign investors to sue them 
through arbitration in the case of dispute. IIAs provide for the use of international arbitration as host 
state courts may be biased and politicised. IIAs thus create public international law commitments 
between sovereign states, which benefit investors and are enforceable by them. Today, some 3000 
IIAs are in force. Most of these agreements are bilateral – hence they are also known as bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) – and create a complex global investment regime. The EU Member States 
developed IIAs in the 1950s and have concluded some 1400 of them. Europe thus stands at the centre 
stage of the global investment regime.  
III. A literature survey – What do we know about business lobbying for IIAs?  
 
The role of business preferences and lobbying in international investment policy is under-researched 
in general, and in particular with regard to the conclusion of IIAs. Yackee (2009, 2010) conducted a 
survey of US companies with investments abroad and found that they were little informed about IIAs 
and hardly took IIAs into account when making international investment decisions. This finding 
implies that these US companies do not lobby for IIAs to enhance outward investment conditions. 
Chilton (2016) assesses the US policymaking process underlying the conclusion of IIAs. He finds that 
non-economic political motivations drive the US approach to IIAs. In a similar vein, Poulsen and 
Aisbett (2015) draw on a large-scale database to show that both political motivations and individual 
incentives for civil servants from developing countries are decisive forces behind the conclusion of 
IIAs. Poulsen (2015) assess why developing countries conclude IIAs. He finds that bounded 
rationality of governments rather than business lobbying accounts for the conclusion of IIAs. An 
extensive econometric literature, moreover, seeks to assess the extent to which IIAs affect 
international investment flows (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009; Hallward-Diremeier, 2013; Neumayer and 
Spess, 2005; Busse et al., 2010; Egger and Merlo, 2007; Colen et al., 2014; Blonigen and Piger, 2014; 
Stein and Daude, 2007). Its findings are mixed. The impact of IIAs seems to strongly depend on 
country dyads and the sectors assessed. These studies indirectly shed light on the role of business 
preferences and lobbying in the conclusion of IIAs. The often negligible impact of IIAs on 
international investment flows suggests that investors pay little attention to IIAs and are therefore 
unlikely to lobby for such agreements.  
 
The scarce literature on the role of business preferences and lobbying in international investment 
policy is illuminating. However, it suffers from two limitations. First, it does not explain the reported 
marginal role of business in international investment policymaking. It merely shows that non-
economic political considerations often dominate international investment policymaking. Second, the 
literature does not offer insights into the role of business preferences and lobbying in the EU context. 
Studies only discuss international investment policymaking in any detail in the US context. As the 
literature on varieties of capitalism suggests, the influence of business preferences on the 
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policymaking process and outcomes differs across countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Crouch, 2005). 
The European context thus merits attention. This article seeks to redress both of these shortcomings. 	
IV. The theoretical framework 
 
A) Perceived economic effects, business lobbying and IIAs 
 
Business-centred explanations of foreign economic policy outcomes work on the assumption that 
these policies affect business profits (Rogowski, 1989; Grossmann and Helpman, 1995; Hiscox, 2002; 
Lake, 2009; Frieden, 1991; Woll, 2008; Milner, 1999; De Bièvre and Dür, 2005; Dür 2007, 2008, 
2012). By enabling or restricting imports and exports, foreign economic policies influence the supply 
and demand for goods and services in an economy. Importing increases the supply of a good or 
service, intensifies competition, pushes down prices and hurts domestic producers but benefits 
domestic consumers. Exporting, on the other hand, increases demand, pushes up prices, benefits 
domestic producers and harms local consumers. A decision by policymakers to pursue liberal or 
protectionist foreign economic policies thus redistributes welfare within society. Scholars of foreign 
economic policy assume that societal actors – namely businesses – are aware of the likely welfare 
impacts of foreign economic policies. Businesses are expected to lobby policymakers for their 
preferred policies to maximise their profits. To maximise their profits, export-competing businesses 
should favour liberal foreign economic policies, whereas import-competing businesses should favour 
protectionist policies. Policymakers, in turn, should be receptive to societal demands to increase their 
support and chances of re-election. They should adjust national foreign economic policy in line with 
dominant societal demands.  
 
International investment policy – including IIAs encompassing post-establishment treatment standards 
and ISDS provisions – is primarily of a regulatory nature. In comparison to classic foreign economic 
policies and trade agreements, international investment policy and IIAs should only have a minimal 
impact on businesses. IIAs do not alter the overall level of openness of economies. Hence, they do not 
affect supply, demand, competition or the prices of goods and services. The limited impact of IIAs 
should translate into a lack of business preferences and lobbying activity.  
 
• Post-establishment treatment standards under IIAs create a minimum level of treatment for 
international investors. Equivalent rights afforded under European and national law exceed the 
basic principles enshrined in IIAs. IIAs thus do not in principle affect the treatment, business 
operating profits or ultimately the welfare of foreign or domestic investors within the EU. 
However, post-establishment treatment standards aim at creating a safer and more predictable 
investment environment for European investors abroad. In the extra-EU context, IIAs may 
thus in principle have a positive impact on outward-oriented businesses by facilitating 
investment ventures abroad. Nevertheless, the evidence points to the contrary. Econometric 
research shows that the conclusion of IIAs does not affect investment flows between 
contracting parties even if the potential endogeneity of IIAs is controlled for (Sauvant and 
Sachs, 2009; Hallward-Diremeier, 2013; Neumeyer and Spess, 2005; Busse et al., 2010; Egger 
and Merlo, 2007; Colen et al., 2014). In fact, survey data suggest that businesses make their 
investment decisions on the basis of the overall business climate, their expected profits and so 
on (Yackee, 2010). IIAs do not play a role in investment decisions. The disregard for IIAs 
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implies that these agreements have only limited perceived positive impacts, which should 
translate into a lack of business lobbying.  
 
• Investment protection provisions under IIAs allow foreign investors to seek compensation in 
the case of expropriation by host countries. However, when investors make an investment 
decision they generally do not know whether they may need access to ISDS at some point in 
the future, or whether their ISDS claim may succeed. Investors are also known to have an 
aversion to using ISDS provisions due to their harmful impact on relations with host countries. 
The use of ISDS is sometimes described as a ‘nuclear option’ as it eradicates the basis for any 
amicable cooperation between host governments and investors. Considering that the formation 
of preferences and in particular lobbying are resource-consuming, the aversion to the use of 
ISDS in combination with the high degree of uncertainty over the future potential benefits of 
IIAs with ISDS provisions should limit business interest and lobbying activity in this domain. 
The econometric research discussed above again backs this reasoning. It suggests that IIAs 
with ISDS provisions play only a marginal role in investment decisions (Sauvant and Sachs, 
2009; Hallward-Diremeier, 2013; Neumeyer and Spess, 2005; Busse et al., 2010; Egger and 
Merlo, 2007; Colen et al., 2014; Yackee, 2009). Other considerations seem to be more 
important for businesses engaged in outward investment. If investment projects go ahead, 
investors typically consider the risk of expropriation to be minor or unavoidable in the face of 
significant profits. Put differently, the risk of expropriation is priced into the investment 
decision. Investment protection and ISDS provisions do not fundamentally affect it.  
 
To conclude, European businesses are unlikely to hold strong preferences or to lobby for traditional 
IIAs encompassing post-establishment treatment and protection provisions. Such IIAs have limited, 
uncertain and at best distant perceived beneficial effects on businesses. The costs of forming 
preferences on complex matters of international investment law and the costs of lobbying 
policymakers seem to outweigh the potential gains for outward-oriented businesses.  
 
B) Public choice, bureaucracies and IIAs 
 
International investment policy and the conclusion of IIAs, I argue, should reflect the preferences and 
actions of bureaucrats rather than the preferences of and lobbying by European businesses. Max 
Weber (1922) was among the first to assess the role of bureaucrats in politics. In Weber’s view, 
elected politicians articulate policy directions, while bureaucrats faithfully implement these policies. 
Nowadays, it is a commonplace that bureaucrats are not mere executors but indeed self-interested 
actors. They exert a strong influence on policy outcomes (Putnam, 1973). Bureaucrats hold technical 
expertise and vague mandates to promote ‘public welfare’ in their respective policy domains. They 
thereby enjoy a leeway to shape policies in line with their individual preferences. An extensive public 
choice literature seeks to identify the factors shaping bureaucrats’ preferences and their strategies for 
putting them into action (see inter alia Niskanen, 1971; Putnam, 1973; Abbott, 2008; Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962). Studies suggest that bureaucrats’ preferences reflect paradigms and heuristic mind-sets 
– and individual welfare maximisation through career advancement and competence extension. In 
short, bureaucrats are likely to use their autonomy in policy development and implementation to do 
what they perceive to be ‘the right thing’ and what benefits themselves and/or their agency.  
 
In what follows, I argue that bureaucrats are the key actors shaping international investment policy, 
including the negotiation of IIAs with ISDS provisions. With the notable recent exception of the TTIP 
negotiations, the considerable degree of technicality and lack of societal interest and lobbying make 
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the domain largely irrelevant for politicians. This lack of politicisation and political oversight should 
increase the leeway for bureaucrats to shape international investment policy, including the conclusion 
of IIAs. In line with research on public choice and bureaucratic politics, international investment 
policy officials should pursue a threefold policy agenda. First, they should pursue and implement 
policies which through their heuristic lenses comply with their mandate and maximise social welfare. 
Their policy choices should comply with their professional ‘ethos,’ mission and causal beliefs. 
Second, bureaucracies are self-interested agencies and social hierarchies. Bureaucrats should pursue 
and implement policies which benefit their institution and please their superiors – be they more senior 
bureaucrats or the political leadership. Third – and closely related – bureaucrats should pursue and 
implement policies which further their individual welfare inter alia in the form of career prospects, 
better standing within their agency and greater competences.   
V. Assessing European business preferences and lobbying in international investment policy 
 
What follows focuses on international investment policymaking in 1) Germany before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty; and 2) in the European Union after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Lisbon Treaty is of relevance because it transferred most investment-related competences from the 
Member States to the EU (Basedow, 2016a). Whereas the Member States were by and large competent 
to regulate international investment before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, since then 
the EU has acquired this competence and role. The choice of Germany and the EU reflects a ‘most 
likely’ case study design. Germany accounts for 17% of the EU’s outward FDI stocks, it ‘invented’ 
modern IIAs in the 1950s and it has signed some 140 IIAs – more than any other country in the world. 
The EU, on the other hand, is the world’s biggest recipient and emitter of FDI (UNCTAD, 2016). If 
we expect business preferences and lobbying to play a decisive role in international investment 
policymaking and in the conclusion of IIAs, it should be observable in particular in these two 
‘extreme’ cases. The following sections briefly assess the international investment policymaking 
process underlying the conclusion of IIAs in Germany and the EU with special attention being given 
to the role of business preferences and lobbying.  
 
A) International investment policymaking in Germany prior to 2009 
 
Policymaking setup: In Germany, the ministry of economics is in charge of international investment 
policymaking. A specialised division in the directorate for foreign economic policy deals with 
international investment policy. It oversees Germany’s investment guarantee scheme, manages the 
investment review mechanism, takes care of Germany’s investment arbitration proceedings and it used 
to negotiate IIAs with third countries. On behalf of the German government, the ministry signed IIAs, 
which were then ratified by the Bundestag. The Bundestag normally ratified IIAs without deliberation 
as a secondary agenda item. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States have 
lost the legal competence to negotiate IIAs with third countries. Nonetheless, the division still plays a 
role in IIA negotiations by representing the German government in the ‘investment configuration’ of 
the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) of the EU’s Council of Ministers. As will be discussed further 
below, the TPC liaises with the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, which 
administers trade and investment policy and leads negotiations with third countries.  
 
The perception of the German business community: The German business community was rarely 
in contact with the German government to discuss international investment policymaking and the 
conclusion of IIAs prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Two factors account for this 
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observed passivity of German business. First, the potential benefits of IIAs were perceived to be 
limited (Interviews with business representatives, 16 Feb. 2012). Companies and business associations 
have limited resources to develop preferences on issues beyond daily business operations and to lobby 
policymakers. Apart from big multinational companies with major public affairs and legal divisions, 
relatively few employees deal with questions of foreign economic policy in companies and business 
associations. Companies and business associations need to prioritise and to weigh the benefits and 
costs of lobbying policymakers on a particular policy issue. In comparison with other foreign 
economic policy issues – such as market access or the protection of intellectual property rights – 
international investment policy and IIAs were considered to be an issue of secondary importance for 
business operations and profits (Dür 2008, 2012). Unlike IIA provisions, enhancing market access or 
improving the protection of intellectual property rights abroad has an immediate effect on business 
operations and profits. The minor perceived positive impact of international investment policy and 
IIAs was reflected in a general lack of expertise among business representatives. As the issue was not 
considered a priority, the business representatives interviewed had a limited understanding of this 
policy domain.  
 
Moreover, international investment policy and the conclusion of IIAs were seen as a proactive service 
which the German government should supply regardless of business demands and lobbying 
(Interviews with business representatives, 16 Feb. 2012). The business representatives did not deny 
that under certain (undesirable) circumstances international investment policy and IIAs could acquire 
importance and enable them to avoid significant losses on investments, but they expected the 
government to be proactive and to act in the interests of German businesses even in the absence of 
lobbying efforts. The relationship between the business community and the government was literally 
compared to a relationship between customers and attentive service providers. As German businesses 
were major taxpayers, the German government should be proactive, pursue business-friendly policies 
and only rely on business input in cases of doubt.  
 
The perception of German bureaucrats: German bureaucrats by and large confirmed the statements 
of the business representatives. They reported having only rarely been in contact with business 
representatives. International investment policymaking and the conclusion of IIAs were predominantly 
a bureaucratic process. This bureaucratic process was shaped by the following considerations.  
 
First and foremost, German bureaucrats implemented international investment policy and concluded 
IIAs in view of limiting the financial exposure of the German taxpayer under the state-backed 
investment guarantee scheme (Interviews with civil servants of the Ministry of Economics, 17 Feb. 
2012, 17 Jun. 2012; Poulsen, 2010). Germany’s international investment policy and IIA programme 
indeed formed an integral part of its investment guarantee scheme. Investment guarantee schemes 
address the so-called ‘hold-off’ problem in international investment activity. Businesses normally 
insure international investment projects against a number of commercial risks such as currency 
fluctuations. However, private insurers may not offer coverage against certain non-commercial risks 
such as civil war or expropriation. This lack of coverage of non-commercial risks may keep 
companies from lucrative and fairly safe investment projects. Such decisions to abstain from 
promising investment projects impose opportunity costs on businesses in the form of foregone profits 
and on national economies in the form of foregone growth and employment. State-backed investment 
guarantee schemes offer insurance against non-commercial risks to enable businesses to go ahead with 
lucrative and fairly safe investment projects. However, Germany typically conditions access to state-
backed investment guarantees on the existence of an IIA with the host country. The underlying 
rationale is that in the case of expropriation the insured company can first seek compensation through 
ISDS. Only if the arbitration claim or its enforcement is unsuccessful may the state-backed investment 
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guarantee scheme have to cover losses. Therefore, in the German system IIAs were and are a tool to 
limit the financial exposure of the German taxpayer under investment guarantee schemes rather than a 
tool to strengthen businesses’ rights vis-à-vis host countries. To identify new partner countries for 
IIAs, the German government monitored the geography and volume of German outward investment 
flows and requests for coverage under its investment guarantee scheme.  
 
Germany’s international investment policy and its conclusion of IIAs reflected further considerations. 
German bureaucrats underlined that they perceived it as their professional – and almost civic – duty to 
support German businesses in their international investment projects. A business-friendly investment 
environment should promote growth, employment and tax revenue and thus further Germany’s general 
public interests. Nonetheless, the bureaucrats did not hide that on certain occasions the conclusion of 
IIAs also reflected more profane considerations. At times, they negotiated IIAs to please and to 
increase their visibility vis-à-vis senior civil servants and the political leadership (Interviews with civil 
servants of the Ministry of Economics, 17 Feb. 2012, 17 Jun. 2012). The signing of IIAs was often a 
welcome photo opportunity for travelling ministers or secretaries of state to signal to voters and 
businesses their commitment to advancing German interests abroad (Interviews with civil servants of 
the Ministry of Economics, 17 Feb. 2012, 17 Jun. 2012). The conclusion of IIAs thus also enhanced 
career opportunities and the visibility of the division dealing with international investment policy 
within the senior ranks of German government.  
 
B) International investment policymaking in the EU after 2009 	
Policymaking setup: Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1st December 2009, the 
Member States held the most relevant competences to regulate international investment flows and to 
conclude IIAs. On insistence of the European Commission (Basedow, 2016a, 2016b), the Lisbon 
Treaty finally extended the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence under the Common Commercial 
Policy to the regulation of ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI). It ended a competence struggle between 
the Commission and the Members States which had been simmering since the 1980s. The EU is now 
by and large in charge of international investment regulation and the conclusion of IIAs, whereas the 
Member States must refrain from individual actions (Dimopoulos, 2011).  
 
The Commission is the key actor in the EU’s new international investment policy. It holds the right to 
initiate investment policy measures and to negotiate IIAs with third countries. To that end, the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade proposes a draft measure or tables a draft mandate for 
IIA negotiations. The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament may then endorse and amend 
the measure or mandate by qualified majority. For the Council of Ministers, the ‘investment 
configuration’ of the TPC interacts with the Commission in the monitoring of IIA negotiations. 
National investment policy officials, who often managed national IIA programmes prior to 2009, sit 
on this committee. Their expertise makes them important counterweights to the Commission in this 
policy domain. For the European Parliament, the International Trade (INTA) Committee monitors and 
interacts with the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Before 2009, the European Parliament 
and the INTA Committee played only a marginal role in foreign economic policy. They have only 
gradually gained experience and managed to shape policy outcomes, notably in highly technical 
domains such as international investment regulation (Woolcock, 2011).  
 
The perception of European business: Prior to the start of the heated TTIP debates, European 
business was rarely in contact with the European Commission or the European Parliament to discuss 
international investment policy and IIAs, despite ongoing major investment negotiations. Interviews 
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with national and European and sectoral and horizontal business associations based in Brussels indeed 
pointed to a remarkable lack of knowledge of international investment policy and IIAs (Interviews 
with business representatives, BDI 16 Feb. 2012, BusinessEurope 26 Jan. 2012, Leviathan 4 Sept. 
2013, MEDEF 3 Oct. 2013, ESF 25 Sept. 2013, CBI 26 Sept. 2013, Confindustria 27 Sept. 2013, 
CityUK 2 Apr. 2014). The limited expected potential benefits arising from international investment 
policy and IIAs are again key to this observation. Brussels-based representatives of national business 
associations such as the BDI (Germany), CBI (United Kingdom), CEOE (Spain), Confindustria 
(Italy), Leviathan (Poland) and MEDEF (France) stressed that they had limited resources to define 
their preferences and to lobby policymakers in foreign economic relations. In most associations, one 
policy officer had to deal with all questions of foreign economic policy. International investment 
policy and IIAs ranked low on the list of the policy priorities of their member companies. Classic 
foreign economic policy issues such as market access questions in the WTO and bilateral trade 
negotiations typically enjoyed much greater salience and thus stood at the centre of the associations’ 
work and discussions with members and policymakers. Moreover, several business representatives 
stressed that their membership was heterogeneous. Many associations counted few major 
multinational enterprises but a high number of small and medium-sized companies, with limited 
investment activities among their members. The heterogeneous membership complicated formulating 
common preferences and lobbying strategies, notably on issues such as international investment policy 
and IIAs. European umbrella associations such as BusinessEurope and the European Services Forum 
(ESF) struggled with the same problems of limited resources and heterogeneous membership 
(Interviews with business representatives, BusinessEurope 26 Jan. 2012, ESF 25 Sept. 2013). They 
stressed that they did not have sufficient resources and found it hard to forge internal compromises on 
many issues such as IIAs. Lobbying for specific IIAs was uncommon.  
 
The perception of the European Commission: Prior to the start of the TTIP debates, the European 
Commission was rarely in contact with business representatives to discuss international investment 
regulation and IIAs (Interviews with civil servants of DG Trade & Cabinet, 13 Jan. 2012, 18 Jan 2012, 
18 Jul. 2012, 24 Jul. 2012, 27 Jul. 2012). In 2012, a senior Commission bureaucrat lamented that 
‘international investment policymaking felt like a blind flight’ removed from societal demands and 
debates (Interview with civil servant from DG Trade, 7 Jul. 2012). The lack of business lobbying or 
general public interest by the media, citizens, most Member States and the European Parliament 
indeed complicated the life of the Commission. Following the competence transfer under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Commission sought to develop a new EU approach to international investment policy and 
IIAs (Interview with civil servant from DG Trade, 13 Jan. 2012; European Commission, 2010). In 
contrast to most of the old Member States, the EU was not only an emitter of outward investment but 
equally a major recipient of inward investment. Therefore, unlike many large old Member States, the 
EU had more nuanced and balanced interests. It had to strike a new balance under EU IIAs between 
ensuring the protection of European investors abroad (offensive) and protecting the right to regulate of 
capital-importing Member States in the light of future ISDS proceedings (defensive). However, the 
Commission’s balancing endeavour was difficult. Only a handful of old Member States – in particular 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Spain – took an interest in these efforts and 
vehemently opposed the Commission’s plans. They wanted the Commission to uphold the so-called 
‘gold standard’ of IIAs which put strong emphasis on the offensive interests of capital-exporting 
countries. The lack of public interest and lobbying made it difficult for the Commission to justify its 
new approach and to form a political alliance against particularly conservative Member States.  
 
In the absence of business lobbying, three factors shaped the Commission’s approach to international 
investment policy and IIAs. First, the Commission bureaucrats were guided by functional and social 
welfare considerations. They sought to develop an EU approach to international investment policy and 
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IIAs which structurally rebalanced the EU’s offensive and defensive aims and served all Member 
States and citizens so as to maximise the EU’s aggregate welfare. A similarly functionalist approach 
guided bureaucrats in the identification of potential partner countries for the EU’s new IIA 
programme. In 2010, the Commission’s communication “Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy” (COM(2010)343) stressed that for the sake of policy rationalisation 
it would seek to include IIA-like provisions in on-going trade negotiations with Canada, Mercosur, 
India and Singapore. The Commission also announced it would assess the feasibility of IIAs with 
China and Russia as major yet difficult recipients of EU-outward investments. Second, after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the Commission was determined to consolidate its controversial 
competences in international investment policy. Throughout the policy debates following the entry 
into force of the Treaty, the Commission advanced an extensive reading of the EU’s new competence 
over investment regulation, which antagonised many Member State governments. The EU’s 
international investment policy of recent years shows traces of bureaucratic competition and has led to 
a request for the still-pending Opinion 2/15 regarding the scope of the EU’s exclusive competences in 
this field (Basedow, 2016a, 2016b). Opinion 2/15 evaluates the scope of the EU’s exclusive 
investment-related competences to conclude trade and investment agreements at the example of the 
EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. Finally, Commission bureaucrats used bureaucratic competition 
over international investment policymaking and the EU’s IIA programme to increase their internal 
visibility and to advance their careers. The confrontation with the Member States increased the 
visibility and importance of working-level bureaucrats vis-à-vis the political leadership of the 
Commission, which was arguably conducive to their career development.  
 
C) European business preferences and lobbying in major international investment negotiations 	
Business lobbying carries a negative connotation. It is often seen as having undue influence on 
policymaking and as a threat to democracy (Campact, 2014; Corporate Europe Observatory 2014a). 
While this view of lobbying is over-simplistic it nonetheless creates serious methodological 
challenges. Neither business representatives nor bureaucrats may faithfully report contacts with 
business actors and their influence on policy outcomes. The following section seeks to cross-validate 
the interview findings by means of complementary methods and data sources. It assesses the role of 
business lobbying in major international investment negotiations.  
 
Since the 1980s, the EU and its Member States have been involved in several major international 
investment negotiations. In terms of geographical scope, breadth and ambition of commitments and 
volume of international investment activities covered, two international investment negotiations stand 
out: the negotiations on the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the ultimately failed talks on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD. The following paragraphs briefly assess 
the preferences and lobbying of European businesses in these international investment negotiations. 
The negotiations constitute so-called ‘most likely cases.’ If European business preferences and 
lobbying affect policy outcomes, it should have become visible in these exceptionally ambitious and 
visible policymaking instances. However, assessment of the ECT and MAI negotiations suggests that 
European business was little interested and in part even opposed these investment negotiations.  
 
The negotiations on the Energy Charter Treaty: The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is little known 
to the general public. It governs energy trade, transport and investment among 52 contracting states 
from western and eastern Europe and Eurasia. It contains inter alia provisions relating to post-
establishment treatment standards and investment protection through ISDS. The content of the ECT is 
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equivalent to traditional IIAs and many of the most mediatised investment arbitrations1 take place 
under it. The ECT was negotiated between 1990 and 1998. The EU proposed its creation in 1990 for 
two reasons. First, Western European policymakers wanted to stabilise the disintegrating Soviet Union 
through the integration of key economic sectors, increased trade and hard currency inflows into the 
crisis-riddled socialist economies. The ECT project echoed the rationale of western European 
integration of geopolitical appeasement and economic prosperity through economic integration 
(Konoplyanik, 1996: 156-157). Second, western European policymakers wanted to embed the 
emerging single market for energy into a broader regional market-based energy regime. Only if major 
transmission and supplier countries endorsed a market-based order for their energy sectors could the 
single market for energy ensure reliable access to affordable energy resources (European Commission, 
1991).  
 
European business was sceptical or hostile toward the ECT project. European utilities were the most 
active business players during the ECT negotiations. They opposed the ECT project outright (Padget, 
1992; Wälde, 1996; Doré, 1996), seeing the ECT negotiations as a Commission attempt to finalise the 
single market for energy and to dismantle their mid- and downstream monopolies through the 
backdoor. In particular, the planned but ultimately scraped investment liberalisation commitments and 
provisions on ‘third party access’ to energy transmission networks preoccupied European utilities. The 
provisions directly challenged their natural monopolies in their respective markets. Other provisions 
such as investment treatment and protection clauses received little attention. European upstream 
energy companies, on the other hand, took some interest in the ECT negotiations and participated in 
consultations. However, they challenged the view of western policymakers that the ECT would 
enhance the business and investment climate in the disintegrating Soviet Union (Jenkins, 1996; 
Müller, 1991). They felt that the ECT was misguided activism by policy-makers who had little 
knowledge of the technicalities of the upstream energy sector and the business challenges in 
transforming socialist economies. Finally, energy consumers did not lobby in the ECT negotiations 
(Basedow, forthcoming). To conclude, European business preferences and lobbying cannot account 
for the creation of the ECT and its ambitious investment provisions.  
 
The negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: The negotiations on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD constituted the second highly ambitious 
international investment project of recent decades. The USA proposed negotiating a binding 
multilateral framework for global investment activities in the OECD as developing countries had 
previously blocked similar initiatives in the GATT (Henderson, 1999; Smythe 1998; Dymond, 1999). 
The US government hoped that the OECD members would find it easy to agree on state-of-the-art 
investment rules which developing and emerging economies would sign up to in order to remain 
competitive. The MAI negotiations started in 1995 but broke down without agreement due to 
substantive, procedural and institutional problems in 1998 (Basedow, 2016b). The negotiations 
focused on three areas: liberalisation commitments; post-establishment and protection standards; and 
finally provisions on investment arbitration.  
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) qualified and criticised the MAI project as a business-led 
neoliberal project (Corporate Europe Observatory, 1998; Smythe, 1998). However, this view strongly 
overstates the influence of business preferences and lobbying on the MAI project. Most accounts 
stress that the project was driven by technocrats rather than politicians or business leaders. In fact, a 																																																								1 The arbitration proceeding Vattenfall vs Germany II regarding Germany’s nuclear phase-out law is 
based on the ECT. In a similar vain, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) vs Russia was based on the 
ECT and led to a $50bn award.  
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lack of involvement of high-ranking politicians and business leaders is seen as one of the key factors 
behind the collapse of the MAI negotiations. Pierre Sauvé, then an OECD official, observed that 
“…bureaucracies were proposing an agreement that the private sector in most countries was not 
necessarily calling for” (as cited in Lawrence et al., 2006, p. 153). The US Council on International 
Business (USCIB) was reportedly the most outspoken supporter within the business community, yet 
observers doubted the authenticity of USCIB support. As the USCIB was led by former diplomats, its 
support was perceived at least partly as personal loyalty toward the US State Department and its ‘pet 
project’ (Lawrence et al., 2006). European business showed some – yet not wholehearted – support. At 
that time, it was primarily interested in an improvement in the business climate in formerly socialist 
and developing countries, which the MAI could not deliver (Woolcock, 1990; Interview, by telephone, 
3 July 2013; Interview, by telephone, 17 June 2013). The lukewarm support of the business 
community became particularly apparent in 1997/1998 when negotiations ran into stalemate and 
NGOs mobilised civil society against the project. To overcome the crisis, technocrats called inter alia 
on the business community – arguably the main beneficiaries of the project – to show public support, 
but without much success (Graham, 2000, p. 49; Lawrence et al., 2006). The negotiations collapsed in 
autumn 1998 without agreement. To conclude, European business showed lukewarm support for the 
MAI project. It did not seek to decisively shape the negotiations.  
 
D) European business preferences and lobbying and the evolving design of IIAs 
 
It is possible to shed additional light on the impact of business preferences and lobbying on 
international investment policy by assessing the evolving design of European IIAs. Some 3000 IIAs 
have been concluded worldwide over the last six decades. The Member States and the EU account for 
some 1400 of these. The design and content of European IIAs has changed over time. The texts have 
become longer and more precise in order to limit the interpretative leeway of arbitrators, to ring-fence 
states’ right to regulate and to cut back investor rights and protection. European IIAs have thereby 
converged toward the so-called NAFTA approach. Findings suggest that even if business had tried to 
shape international investment policy and IIAs it was manifestly not very successful in influencing 
policy outcomes.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s – the heyday of IIA negotiations – the Member States concluded an old-
fashioned type of IIAs. While not identical, these IIAs are very similar in substance and even wording. 
The so-called Dutch and German ‘gold standard’ IIAs are the most famous and illustrative exponents 
of this type of IIA (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012; Alschner, 2013). These old-fashioned IIAs are short. 
They count only 8 to 10 pages (see Figure 2). They contain vague treatment and protection standards 
which the contracting states commit to afford to foreign investors. Proponents and critics alike 
emphasise that these old-fashioned agreements are very business friendly. They barely define the 
investments and investors covered and the treatment and protection standards afforded. This 
considerable leeway for arbitrators to interpret these agreements results in low hurdles for establishing 
a breach of states’ commitments vis-à-vis foreign investors. Old-fashioned IIAs thereby create high 
levels of investment protection. Critiques warn that old-fashioned IIAs endanger states’ ability to 
regulate, render outcomes of investment arbitration hard to predict and create considerable financial 
risks for taxpayers (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2012; Reinisch, 2013).  
 
Concerns over the vague language in vintage IIAs started mounting in the 1990s. In particular, the 
USA – followed by Canada – began developing more precise language on investment treatment and 
protection based on their Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (see Figure 2) (Alschner, 
2013; Gaukrodger, 2017). The objective was to clarify host states’ obligations and rights vis-à-vis 
  14 
foreign investors through more precise language, to limit taxpayers’ financial risks and to make the 
use of ISDS more predictable by limiting the interpretative leeway for arbitrators. The conclusion of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the USA, Canada and Mexico arguably 
marked the beginning of this development trajectory. Chapter 11 of NAFTA is equivalent to a 
standalone IIA in terms of substance. It contains provisions regarding post-establishment treatment 
and protection of foreign investors. It is more detailed than old-fashioned European IIAs and the US 
model BIT of 1984. While this model BIT – much like European IIAs – counted only 8 pages, 
NAFTA Chapter 11 already comprises some 20 pages. The more precise language enshrined in 
NAFTA Chapter 11 defines in greater detail inter alia which foreign-owned assets do or do not 
qualify as investments governed and protected by the agreement. The US model BITs of 2004 and 
2012 continue along this development trajectory. They count more than 40 pages and define in 
significant detail inter alia the crucial minimum treatment standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment.’ 
The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard is among the most frequently invoked treatment and 
protection standards in investment arbitration proceedings and therefore a cornerstone of IIAs 
(Gaukrodger, 2017; UNCTAD, 2012). While old-fashioned IIAs only make brief mention of the 
obligation of the contracting states to afford ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to foreign investors, the new 
type of IIAs delimits the exact meaning of the obligation over several paragraphs. The rationale is to 
prevent arbitrators from interpreting the standard as a ‘stabilisation’ obligation, making it impossible 
for host states to change regulations, legislation, tax policies and the like, affecting business profits 
without facing potentially costly arbitration awards. The so-called NAFTA approach thereby 
strengthens state rights while arguably lowering the level of investment protection (Gaukrodger, 2017; 
Reinisch, 2013: 28-29).  
 
Figure 2: Average word count of BITs of selected countries per five-year period with trend lines 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2014), author’s calculations. 
 
 
The IIAs recently negotiated between the EU and third countries in many regards emulate the NAFTA 
approach. Recent European IIAs have become longer and are more precise than old-fashioned ones. 
The occasionally decried ‘NAFTA-contamination’ (Peterson, 2011) of European IIAs is most visible 
with regard to the definition of the investments covered and the central ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
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standard. While old-fashioned European IIAs typically contain an open-ended definition of the 
investments and investors covered, recent European IIAs such as Comprehensive Trade and Economic 
Agreement (CETA) with Canada and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) follow the 
NAFTA approach by providing a conclusive list of investments and investors covered (Henckels, 
2016; Titi, 2015). In a similar vein, recent EU IIAs depart from the old-fashioned IIA approach by 
providing a detailed and quasi-exhaustive definition of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard. 
Rather than making a brief mention of the standard, in NAFTA-like fashion they enumerate the 
features of state measures violating the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard. Policymakers thereby 
intend to limit the leeway of arbitrators to prevent an overly-investor-friendly interpretation of the 
standard and to ring-fence states’ right to regulate (Henckels, 2016; Titi, 2015; Lavranos, 2014). One 
expert even laments that the narrow wording enshrined in CETA risks hollowing out the standard and 
may make it impossible for investors to invoke it (Lavranos, 2014). To conclude, the design and 
content of European IIAs have evolved over time. They have cut back on investor rights and 
strengthened state rights. This finding challenges the assumption that business preferences and 
lobbying decisively shape international investment policy.  
V. Why are the TTIP negotiations different?  
 
The empirical assessment above has shown that in the European context business preferences and 
lobbying are not the central driver and shaper of international investment policy and IIAs. 
Bureaucratic dynamics and state interests better account for policy outcomes. European business is 
nonetheless strongly involved in the current heated debates on TTIP and lobbies for an ambitious 
investment chapter. How can one explain this outlying observation?  
 
Theoretical work on the formation of business preferences offers a likely explanation (DiMaggio and 
Powel, 1991; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Woll, 2006, 2008; Wildavsky, 1987). Scholars have pointed out 
that a bottom-up approach to modelling business-state relations is over-simplistic. Policymaking is a 
highly complex and technical process in many domains. Non-state actors – including businesses – 
often struggle to understand their interests, to develop concrete preferences on policies and therefore 
to lobby policymakers. Scholars suggest that the institutional environment and regular interactions 
between governments and businesses create paradigms, disseminate information, shape cost-benefit 
perceptions and may thereby decisively shape preferences and lobbying (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Woll (2008) argues with regard to business preferences and lobbying in EU foreign economic policy. 
She argues that interactions between businesses and governments are circular – rather than 
unidirectional – relationships. Governments and businesses mutually construct their preferences on 
policy issues. She suggests that businesses struggle to understand how modern foreign economic 
policies affect their operations. Whereas classic trade policy measures like tariffs have well-known 
efficiency and redistributive effects, modern foreign economic policy measures – such as post-
establishment treatment and investment protection clauses – have uncertain complex impacts. 
Businesses may fail to follow potentially important policy debates, and may not develop preferences 
or lobby policy-makers. Instead, governments, which stand at the centre of foreign economic policy 
debates, often need to approach national business communities, provide initial information and ask for 
business views on the issues discussed. Governments – intentionally or unintentionally – thus provide 
initial information and heuristic frameworks for businesses to interpret their policy environment, to 
develop preferences and to lobby. At times, governments exploit their influence to shape business 
preferences and lobbying activity in line with their bureaucratic policy agenda.  
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The circular model of business-government relations may explain business activism in international 
investment policy in the context of the TTIP negotiations. It implies that the European business 
lobbying observed inter alia for an IIA-like investment chapter under TTIP may be the result of 
bureaucratic mobilisation of European business. Indeed, the launch of the TTIP negotiations in 2013 
reflected both – bureaucratic politics and business lobbying (De Bièvre and Polleti, 2016; Siles-
Brügge and De Ville, 2016; Young, 2016). Certain companies and sectors – such as carmakers, 
pharmaceutical producers and food industries – strongly lobbied for a transatlantic trade agreement to 
lower the remaining tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014b). However, 
the European Commission was also eager to negotiate TTIP in order to prove itself as a broker in 
global affairs. The Commission strongly pushed for the TTIP negotiations in EU-internal debates with 
the Member States and the European Parliament, arguing that TTIP would counterbalance TPP, ensure 
a level playing field for European firms in the important US market and allow Europeans together 
with the USA to define the rules of global trade governance for the next decades (Interview with 
former civil servant of DG Trade; 24 Sept. 2014; Basedow, 2014).  
 
The inclusion of investment provisions in the TTIP negotiations was a result of a combination of 
bureaucratic and business preferences. The US business community reportedly showed interest in a 
comprehensive investment chapter with ISDS provisions. It sought to improve market access and the 
legal environment in eastern and southern Member States with a mixed track record in the rule of law. 
European business may have looked kindly on the idea of including an ambitious investment chapter 
in the TTIP but did not proactively push for such a chapter. On the European side, the Commission 
was reportedly a key advocate of a comprehensive investment chapter with ISDS provisions 
(Interviews with civil servants of DG Trade, 24 Sept. 2014; 25 Jul. 2012). While the USA has a highly 
developed rule of law and an effective court system limiting the added value of ISDS provisions from 
a European perspective, the Commission stressed that TTIP should set a precedent for future trade and 
investment agreements with third countries with less developed legal systems (Poulsen et al., 2015; 
Baetens, 2015). The inclusion of an ambitious investment chapter in the TTIP was thus primarily of 
strategic importance. Beyond these considerations, the Commission also manifestly sought to 
consolidate the EU’s newly gained and still controversial competences in international investment 
policy (Interviews with civil servants of DG Trade, 24 Sept. 2014; 25 Jul. 2012). By including 
investment provisions in the TTIP negotiations, the Commission could prove itself as Europe’s 
negotiator for investment provisions in highly visible and mediatised negotiations.  
 
Soon after the launch of the negotiations in 2013, opposition to the TTIP started mounting in Europe. 
NGOs, trade unions, media and politicians started harshly criticising the project (Bauer, 2013). The 
‘Stop TTIP’ initiative quickly gained broad popular support in Europe. It focused on a few key issues 
such as food hygiene regulation (‘chlorine chicken’) and ISDS to mobilise citizens. While prior to the 
TTIP negotiations most people had never heard of ISDS, it became one of the most widely discussed 
policy issues in the public debate in Europe. The pending investment arbitration proceeding Vattenfall 
AB (Sweden) et al. vs Germany (II) regarding Germany’s nuclear phase-out provided an ideal focal 
point for the public debate and opposition against ISDS and TTIP (ECT, 2015). The investment 
chapter envisaged, with its standard ISDS clauses, thus became one of the decisive and most divisive 
components in the political struggle over TTIP. Confronted with broad societal opposition, the 
European Commission called on the Member States to reconfirm their political commitment to the 
TTIP project and reportedly also asked European businesses – as key stakeholders – to assume 
responsibility in the public debate by showing support for the project (Politico, 2016; Corporate 
Europe Observatory, 2014b). The sudden and exceptionally vocal support of European business for 
IIA-like provisions on post-establishment treatment, protection and ISDS under the TTIP indeed 
points to such reverse lobbying. It will raise eyebrows that European business had hardly ever taken an 
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interest in international investment policy and the conclusion of IIAs yet it suddenly showed vocal 
support for – of all things – negotiations with one of the most highly developed and secure legal 
systems in the world. The assumption that business support for international investment provisions 
under TTIP may be the result of bureaucratic mobilisation becomes more credible considering that 
European business shows little interest in such provisions in other ongoing negotiations with India, 
China, Malaysia, Mercosur, Myanmar and Japan. The rule of law and the investment climate are 
worse in most of these countries yet European business remains largely silent on the need for post-
establishment treatment, protection and ISDS provisions. To conclude, while European business 
indeed shows vocal support for an IIA-like investment chapter under TTIP, this remarkable and 
sudden interest may stem from bureaucratic mobilisation.  
VI. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
This study has raised the question of whether European business lobbies on international investment 
policy and more precisely on IIAs. On the basis of interviews with policymakers and business 
representatives, assessments of major investment negotiations and the evolution of the content of IIAs, 
it has found that business rarely holds preferences or lobbies in this domain. The limited, uncertain, 
distant and little understood potential benefits that IIAs may offer explain the high degree of business 
lethargy. The study has suggested that bureaucratic politics and state interests are the main factors 
shaping international investment policy and IIA programmes. It has also addressed the question of 
why European businesses nonetheless forcefully lobby for investment provisions under the TTIP. 
Drawing on recent theoretical work on the formation of business preferences and lobbying, it has 
suggested that the remarkable role of business in this particular policymaking instance may be the 
result of bureaucratic mobilisation.  
 
The study makes several contributions. First, it ties into a literature which critically evaluates the role 
of non-state actors in policymaking (Lake, 2009; Woll, 2008; Young, 2016). More specifically, the 
findings caution that the widely-held assumption that business preferences and lobbying are the main 
factors shaping policy outcomes in foreign economic policy may be misleading. Foreign economic 
policy is less about market access and increasingly about highly technical issues. Business may 
struggle to understand how measures and agreements affect their operations and profits. Hence, it may 
be necessary to fundamentally rethink business-government relations in this policy domain. It must be 
emphasised, however, that this study has focused on the preferences and lobbying of actual European 
investors – in other words businesses with actual investments abroad. It deliberately ignores the role of 
law firms involved in investment arbitration. Investment arbitration is an extremely lucrative domain 
of legal practice. Unlike investors, law firms may hold strong preferences and lobby policy-makers 
over IIAs with low thresholds for arbitration proceedings with an eye to generating business 
opportunities. The preferences, lobbying and influence of law firms constitute an intriguing and 
important domain for future research. Second, the findings have important policy implications 
(Poulsen et al., 2015; Baetens, 2015). Conservative policymakers occasionally argue that the 
rebalancing of state and investor rights under IIAs may have detrimental effects on international 
investment activity, growth, employment and prosperity. The study has suggested that business takes 
little interest in IIAs. It is therefore unlikely that a rebalancing of state and investor rights under IIAs 
may have a significant impact on our economies. Policymakers therefore enjoy greater leeway in the 
reform of IIAs than is often expected. The study thereby ties into a growing econometric literature 
which critically evaluates the macroeconomic effects of IIAs. Rather than focusing on investor 
preferences and reactions, European policymakers should reassess the extent to which IIAs strike an 
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adequate balance between the public interest in encouraging outward investments and the protection of 
taxpayers under national investment guarantee schemes.  
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